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Abstract
We are pleased to share these articles, written by selected scholars who presented at a symposium held at
Osgoode Hall Law School on September 15, 2015. With the support of the Pierre Genest Memorial Fund, the
Nathanson Centre on Transactional Human Rights, Crime and Security, and the Institute for Feminist Legal
Studies, our objective at the symposium was to address pressing contemporary issues including access to
reproductive technologies, sex work, evolving notions of sovereignty, and the refugee crisis. We explored the
power and limits of market forces and regulatory tools for addressing these issues, while stimulating lively and
respectful discussion that contemplated possible responses to these pressing social issues. Eighteen scholars
engaged on a variety of topics that cut across constitutional law, criminal law, immigration and refugee law,
sexuality and the law, and business law.
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KIMBERLY KRAWIEC*, POONAM PURI† & MITU GULATI‡
WE ARE PLEASED TO SHARE THESE ARTICLES, written by selected scholars who 
presented at a symposium held at Osgoode Hall Law School on September 15, 
2015.1 With the support of the Pierre Genest Memorial Fund, the Nathanson 
Centre on Transactional Human Rights, Crime and Security, and the Institute for 
Feminist Legal Studies, our objective at the symposium was to address pressing 
contemporary issues including access to reproductive technologies, sex work, 
evolving notions of sovereignty, and the refugee crisis. We explored the power 
and limits of market forces and regulatory tools for addressing these issues, while 
stimulating lively and respectful discussion that contemplated possible responses 
to these pressing social issues. Eighteen scholars engaged on a variety of topics 
that cut across constitutional law, criminal law, immigration and refugee law, 
sexuality and the law, and business law.
Our interest in the symposium was sparked by an analysis of free market 
exchange. Within market-based economies, parties are generally free to exchange 
goods and services as they choose. Freedom of contract is a guiding principle, 
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though an exchange may be regulated to protect consumers, promote competition, 
and collect taxes. There are certain goods and services, however, that governments 
either prohibit from trade or regulate to such an extent that makes it clear that 
those exchanges are disfavored. Within Canada, human biological material, 
sexual services, sovereignty, and refugees fall into this category of disfavoured 
exchange. States use an arsenal of tools, from refusal to enforce such contracts 
to armed intervention, to prevent these markets from flourishing. Think of sex. 
Most states either prohibit or heavily regulate the exchange of sex for monetary 
compensation (often with the justification that they are doing it to “protect” 
people from their bad choices). Yet, the same exchange, when done for free, 
is largely a matter of private choice. A similar dynamic can be observed with 
the exchange of human organs for transplantation. In most countries (including 
Canada and the United States), for example, two biologically incompatible pairs 
can engage in a swap in which the donor from Pair A donates to the recipient in 
Pair B and vice versa. But it is illegal to swap the same kidney among the same 
set of people in exchange for money. In other words, kidney barter, but not 
kidney sale, is permitted. What explains the different treatment of these very 
similar transactions? Why does the presence or absence of a profit motive dictate 
the legal treatment of certain exchanges? We are not, of course, the first ones 
to ask these questions. Scholars from a wide range of disciplines such as Alvin 
Roth, Viviana Zelizer, Gary Becker, Peggy Radin, Richard Posner, Kieran Healy, 
James Boyle and others have engaged these questions for years, without reaching 
consensus. In this symposium, we seek to build on and push their work further.2
Prohibiting exchange can have unintended harmful consequences. For 
instance, the use of the blunt instrument of the criminal law to suppress markets 
in sexual services forces sex workers underground and into unsafe working 
environments. Similarly, the refusal to consider exchanging control over a separatist 
region for financial compensation can result in violence, to the detriment of both 
the region itself and the state to which it belongs. These significant harms call into 
question the role that morals should play in the decision to restrict a market. The 
symposium out of which this special issue was born aimed to critically analyze 
the concerns surrounding controversial markets, the strengths and limitations of 
market allocation and regulation as an alternative for addressing them.
2. See e.g. Alvin E Roth, “Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets” (2007) 21:3 J Econ Persp 
37; Elisabeth Landes & Richard A Posner, “The Economics of the Baby Shortage” (1978) 7 J 
Legal Stud 323; Viviana A Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005); Kieran Healy & Kimberly D Krawiec, “Repugnance Management and 
Transactions in the Body” 107:5 Amer Econ Rev: Papers and Proceedings 86.
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This special issue starts with an essay comparing contractualization and 
commodification in the context of babyselling—the purchasing of adoption—to 
show the complexity and dilemmas of arguments about commodification. In “From 
Babyselling to Boilerplate: Reflections on the Limits of the Infrastructures of the 
Market,”3 Margaret Jane Radin takes up the issue of commodification, questioning 
what things, relationships or attributes should not be subject to monetization 
and trade. Radin, whose work on the proper boundaries of the marketplace 
is rightly considered foundational, examines the issue of contractualization, 
focusing on a situation existing in the contemporary United States, in which 
mass-market fine-print “contracts” are waiving recipients’ legal rights, especially 
to redress grievances. Radin elegantly makes the move showing how the legal 
fiction of a “bargained for exchange” simply does not exist in the context of most 
boilerplate rights waivers. Radin argues for market-inalienability—that is to say, 
there are some rights that should be permanently in the care of the polity, and 
that individuals should not be able to waive, even with consent, at least not on a 
mass-market basis. Radin then proposes to replace the use of contract doctrines 
with a better regime with which society might develop limits to the extremes of 
fine-print rights deletion by firms.
Building on the controversy of exchange in human biological material, 
Nicola Lacetera surveys the existing literature in economics and moral 
philosophy on this topic, discussing how an understanding of the ways in which 
people analyze efficiency and morality tradeoffs in the context of these contested 
exchanges is important to understanding, and possibly reformulating, public 
policy. In “Incentives, Ethics, and the Economics of Body Parts,”4 Lacetera lays 
out recent research showing that properly devised economic incentives increase 
the supply of blood without hampering its safety; similar effects may be possible 
for other body parts, such as bone marrow and organs as well. These positive 
effects alone, however, do not justify the introduction of payments for supplying 
body parts, when these activities concern contested commodities or repugnant 
transactions. When transactions concern contested commodities, societies often 
face trade-offs between the efficiency effects of trades mediated by a monetary 
price, and the moral opposition to the provision of these payments. Lacetera 
describes and discusses the current debate on the role of moral repugnance and 
concerns surrounding monetary payments for body parts, with a focus on markets 
for organs, tissues, blood, and plasma. He concludes with a discussion of recent 
3. (2017) 54:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 339
4. (2017) 54:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 397
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research focused on understanding the trade-offs that individuals face when 
forming their opinions about how a society should organize these transactions.
The special issue then transitions from the individual to the corporate 
setting, with a discussion of controversies arising from the emergence of “wolf 
packs,” which are loose networks of parallel-minded shareholders (typically 
hedge funds) that act together to effect change in a given corporation without 
disclosing their collective interest. Wolf packs are able to circumvent disclosure 
rules generally applied to shareholders that act together by deliberately avoiding 
being characterized as a “group” for the purposes of United States securities 
law or as acting jointly or in concert for the purposes of Canadian securities 
laws. Building on the theme of controversial markets, Anita Anand and Andrew 
Mihalik probe the role of wolf packs in Canadian corporate governance and 
particularly in change of control transactions in their paper, “Coordination and 
Monitoring in Changes of Control: The Controversial Role of ‘Wolf Packs’ in 
Capital Markets.”5 Changes of control, especially in the hostile bid context, are 
controversial given that the target company’s board may have differing views on 
the best interests of the company and its strategic objectives. This paper provides 
an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature and seeks to make the case 
for a broader application of the early warning regime.
Following the controversy of control as an exchanged element in 
commodification, Dania Thomas provides a critical analysis of the infamous pari 
passu litigation in the courts of New York over Argentina’s mammoth default 
on its sovereign debt a decade and a half ago.6 That litigation, Thomas argues, 
exposed the dangers of entrusting common law courts with the impossible role 
of enforcing contracts in the ad hoc “non-system” that currently exists to resolve 
sovereign insolvency. In “Sovereign Debt as a Commodity: A Contract Law 
Perspective,”7 Thomas works on identifying the unintended consequences of 
judicial intervention in this context. In seeking to fulfill their enforcement role, 
Thomas argues, the courts have dismantled common law checks and balances, 
gone beyond precedent, and devised remedies on an interpretation that defied 
market convention. Thomas argues that the challenges the courts face negotiating 
this “non-system” require them to play an inadvertent expansive “regulatory” 
5. (2017) 54:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 377
6. The litigation at the heart of Thomas’ analysis goes under the caption NML Capital 
v Republic of Argentina. For additional detail, see Lee C Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, 
“Restructuring Sovereign Debt after NML v. Argentina” (2017) Cap Mkts LJ [forthcoming 
in 2017]. Draft available online, at <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=6342&context=faculty_scholarship>.
7. (2017) 54:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 418
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role. An unintended consequence of this expansive role is sustaining the legal 
fiction that sovereign debt is a commodity. To enforce contracts, judges must 
now ensure that creditors enjoy their property (debt) without constraints and 
assume away the externalities that arise from their unlimited enjoyment. Thomas 
then discusses the wider ramifications of this legal fiction and the possibility 
that this may be influencing the resistance of the official sector in the Eurozone 
and elsewhere to countenance debt workouts. She questions the idea that the 
possibility of enforcement in this instance indicates that we are closer to achieving 
the legal regime theorized as the neutral backdrop of competitive markets.
The special issue concludes with a dialogue between Mitu Gulati and 
Joseph Blocher, on the one hand, and Karen Knop, on the other, on the topic of 
commodifying sovereignty. The conversation begins with Gulati and Blocher in 
their paper “Markets and Sovereignty,”8 asking whether sovereign territory, like 
property, could be traded among countries while still respecting people’s interest 
in self-determination. Across the world, they claim, many regions are located in 
the wrong nations–wrong in the sense that the people of these regions believe 
they would be safer, happier, and wealthier if surrounded by different borders and 
governed by different leaders. These people might be able to improve their lot by 
voting out their current government or by emigrating, but those are imperfect 
solutions and are often unavailable to those who need them most. Gulati and 
Blocher ask how international law could help ameliorate the bad government 
problem by facilitating welfare-enhancing border changes.
Knop, however, views the issue through a different lens. In “A Market 
for Sovereignty? The Roles of Other States in Self-Determination,”9 she does 
not look at commodification as a solution, but as a set-up of the problem of 
self-determination, inquiring into ‘who’ becomes legally relevant. Knop’s 
paper draws on a wealth of both historical and contemporary literature on 
self-determination, in a creative way that critically engages Blocher and Gulati. 
For international lawyers, the more novel inquiry is prompted by Blocher and 
Gulati’s view of the actors relevant to secession, as distinct from cession, and to 
self-determination generally. Knop seeks to show that treated as an experiment 
in framing, Blocher and Gulati’s inclusion of other states should provoke a fresh 
look at self-determination in international law that moves beyond a focus on 
the so-called parent state and, in cases of violence, on the alternative responses 
by international institutions. Among constitutional theorists, there is increasing 
8. (2017) 54:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 464
9. (2017) 54:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 490
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caution about the romance of the idea that individuals single-handedly decide 
their collective futures.
The Law and Markets special issue built upon the platform provided by the 
symposium to facilitate further critical analysis and dialogue among scholars on 
key ethical and legal challenges with which controversial markets are fraught. 
We hope that this interdisciplinary effort will better inform future debates and 
decision-making by presenting important considerations for determining the 
appropriate use of market allocation mechanisms and the extent of regulation for 
contentious subjects of trade. We hope you enjoy reading this issue as much as 
we enjoyed putting it together.
